What an embarrassment to the most powerful nation on earth — and a travesty of justice against one of the most important political figures in modern history: President Donald J. Trump.
It is traitorous, inexcusable, and a national disgrace that after multiple assassination attempts on a current or future president, there has been no serious public reckoning — no full transparency, no comprehensive accountability, and no one brought to justice in a way that answers the obvious questions.
For the top security agencies in the world to be outsmarted by an untrained 20-year-old who got off eight shots from a rooftop — killing a rallygoer, wounding two others, and grazing a presidential candidate — while elite protection failed to act, is a humiliating spectacle that turned America into a punchline for its adversaries.
Trump is back and cleaning house with leadership changes, internal audits, and IG reviews. But is the rot truly gone — and will those responsible ever be caught and held accountable? From a counter-terrorism training perspective, the failures in Butler and Palm Beach demand a hard, unsparing review.
Crooks: The Setup in Butler
Thomas Matthew Crooks was the perfect patsy: 20 years old, isolated, and conveniently tied to both political parties — registered at one point as a Republican, at another as a Democrat. He had been flagged as unsafe enough to be rejected from his high-school rifle team, yet was later able to practice unsupervised at a local range.
In the days before the rally, he bought ammunition and, according to law enforcement briefings, flew a drone near the site — about 200 yards from the rally footprint — scoping the AGR International complex behind the stage. He also carried a rangefinder and was spotted loitering by the building. And yet, no one thought to set up even basic security cameras to monitor the obvious approaches.
When the moment came, Crooks climbed onto the roofline and took position roughly 400 to 450 feet from the stage. In under six seconds, he fired eight rounds from an AR-style rifle — killing one spectator, wounding two more, and grazing Trump’s ear before a counter-sniper put him down.
Security collapsed in layers. No USSS counter-sniper was posted on the very roof he used. Rear approaches and sightlines around AGR — outside the formal magnetometer perimeter — were not locked down, even though they were the most obvious elevated positions within rifle range. There was no aerial overwatch, no drone feed, no counter-UAS system. Local and federal officers saw Crooks multiple times before the shots, but the alerts never translated into an intercept. Reviews later called it “foreseeable, preventable,” pointing to broken communications, absent drone coverage, and poor command.
Early reports suggested he brought a ladder; later documents indicated he had purchased one but likely climbed HVAC piping and roof transitions. Either way, the result was the same: the highest-risk perch remained unsecured. Investigators also documented internet searches for “AGR International” and Butler layouts in the week prior. Photographs showed Crooks near the site with a rangefinder, a bicycle staged for escape, and a backpack — classic pre-operational indicators. None of this triggered a lockdown.
Most damning of all: there was no ballistic glass shielding either the podium or the audience. Only after Butler did the Secret Service deploy bullet-resistant panels and expand rooftop overwatch. That was not precaution. That was a silent admission.
Any professional counter-terror planner would have seen the red flags. A competent sniper can hit at over 2,000 yards; Crooks was within 500. Outer-ring control means every roof within that range must either be denied or occupied. Aerial layering means continuous drone detection and ISR over rear approaches; none was active. Indicators like drone flights, rangefinder use, rooftop pacing, or suspicious purchases should have triggered immediate interdiction. They didn’t. Communications discipline means one common picture across all units; instead, calls about a man near AGR were lost in fractured command. Butler was not an unforeseeable breach. It was a permitted window.
Routh: The Breach in Palm Beach
Nine weeks later, the pattern rhymed. On September 15, 2024, Ryan Wesley Routh, a 58-year-old with a long criminal record, extremist writings, and a chaotic political trail, was discovered with a scoped AK-style rifle in vegetation near Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach — within 300 to 500 yards of Trump’s position on the course.
A Secret Service agent spotted the weapon and moved to interdict. Routh fled but was caught and later indicted for attempted assassination of a major presidential candidate. His trial is pending; prosecutors say he conducted weeks of online research into sniper tactics and attack planning.
Routh’s background raises as many questions as Crooks’. Reports described him as a former CIA contractor, though the agency has never confirmed the detail. But “CIA contractor” is a deliberately vague label. It doesn’t necessarily mean sworn agent; it usually points to indirect work through outside companies that supply logistics, linguistics, cyber, or security personnel. Many ex-military and law-enforcement figures pass through these pipelines. His exact role remains sealed — a smokescreen that hints at intelligence ties without proving responsibility.
Was Routh paid by the CIA, by military contractors, or by globalist interests threatened by Trump’s policies? No one will say. What we do know is telling: his case files were locked down with unusual speed; leaks suggested ties to Ukraine, where Trump’s foreign policy threatened entrenched interests; and his online rants painted him as erratic and inconsistent. Extremists without coherent ideology often make the most useful pawns. Their contradictions provide cover for handlers, and their volatility makes them disposable.
The protective picture in Palm Beach was equally damning. One of the most secure properties in America, with predictable motorcade routes and well-known course patterns, was left with open firing windows from accessible terrain. Anyone with a rifle, rangefinder, and patience could predict the president’s location within minutes. Yet there was no aerial overwatch, no counter-drone, and no offset patrols. The breach was stopped not by the system, but by the eyesight of a single agent. That is not layered security. That is luck.
From a counter-terrorism perspective, the vulnerabilities were glaring. Golf courses present long open sightlines; every rise in terrain and every tree line must be mapped, cleared, and either denied or occupied. Surveillance should extend at least 1,000 yards from predictable positions. Layered detection, UAS sweeps, and electronic surveillance should track every movement in the area. That didn’t happen in Palm Beach. Instead, a man with a scoped rifle and a sealed background got into position and set up shop.
What is left unsaid may be the most dangerous. Routh’s sealed history, his alleged CIA ties, and his convenient timing suggest more than just another madman in the bushes. Like Crooks, he had access, preparation, and opportunity. Like Crooks, he found a window the Secret Service left open. And like Crooks, his profile fits not the “lone wolf” narrative but the expendable instrument — a man with nothing to lose, whose story ends in silence while institutions avoid accountability.
Conclusion: A Republic in the Crosshairs
Put the two together and the pattern is clear. Known sightlines and rooftops were left unsecured. Outer rings beyond the magnetometers were not controlled. Aerial surveillance and counter-drone measures were absent. Warnings traveled but did not produce action.
At Butler, a shooter fired eight rounds in under six seconds from a range every professional knows is lethal if left unguarded. At Palm Beach, a gunman got within range at a predictable venue. Both attacks exposed the same gaps — failures that were foreseeable, preventable, and inexcusable.
Media and political responses mirrored the vacuum. Outlets refused to call them assassination attempts. Democrats issued muted statements. The narrative shifted to “mental health” rather than political violence. If Biden had been targeted, the nation would have gone into lockdown under emergency declaration and nonstop coverage. The selective silence was complicity.
History shows the pattern: JFK challenged the CIA and was assassinated. RFK threatened the establishment and was assassinated. COINTELPRO, MK-Ultra, and the Phoenix Program all prove U.S. intelligence has eliminated threats by proxy. Trump has threatened the intelligence-industrial complex for nearly a decade. Crooks and Routh do not fit the “crazy loner” archetype. They fit the expendable-instrument pattern — the useful pawn, designed to fail while protecting those above them.
Whether through gross negligence or deliberate sabotage, these repeated failures benefited Trump’s enemies: globalist elites, entrenched intelligence factions, and radical Democrats terrified of losing their grip on power.
What happened in 2024 was not random, and it was not merely the work of lone madmen. It was calculated — two operations exploiting predictable windows inside a protective system that should never have allowed them. Crooks fired eight rounds from an obvious roof and killed a father in front of his daughter. Routh got close enough with a scoped rifle at a predictable golf course. Agencies admitted to cascades of preventable failures. Ballistic glass appeared. Some personnel were disciplined. Leaders resigned. But the core question remains: has anything truly been fixed from the ground up, or have the labels changed while the vulnerabilities remain?
From a counter-terrorism perspective, these events expose a live threat environment, not a closed case. Every day that Trump speaks at a rally, sits in a meeting, or plays a round of golf, he is in danger. So is the White House itself. So are his staff, his family, and the ordinary citizens who gather around him. Butler proved it in blood: the crowd was as exposed as the candidate. Unless outer rings are hardened, aerial and drone layers are constant, rooftops are denied or occupied, and every suspicious indicator flips an immediate switch across command, it will happen again.
